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Introduction
This article examines the provision of 
basic education services after the end of 
the Second Sudanese Civil War in 2005, 
focusing on the condition of the services 
and its implications for national cohesion 
during the period after the birth of the South 
Sudanese state. It argues that the way 
basic education services were provided 
after the Second Sudanese Civil War has 
contributed to the trajectory of inequality 
that characterised the period before the 
onset of this war. This trajectory significantly 
deviated from the vision the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) 
promised during its bloody armed struggle 
against Sudanese regimes based in the 
national capital, Khartoum. 
The 2008 SPLM Manifesto espoused the 
“New Sudan” ideology, which ostensibly 
strived to establish a “political dispensation 
that provides equal opportunities for every 
Sudanese to develop and realize his or her 
potential” (SPLM 2008). It further expressed 
an unflinching belief in democracy “with a 
social content which includes: awareness 
of, an attention to, the needs of poor and 
economically disadvantaged individuals and 
groups, primarily with respect to healthcare, 
education, employment and social safety 
nets” (ibid).   
Leaders of the SPLM/A stated their vision 
would replace the one pursued by the 
leaders of what they termed the “Old 
Sudan” if they came to power and would 
propel the country to peace, prosperity, and 
national unity. According to them, in the 
“Old Sudan” uneven development, especially 
unequal distribution of educational and 
other basic services, maintained people 
who identified themselves as Muslims and 
Arabs in privileged political, social, and 
economic positions (Roden 1994). They 
also argued that the “Arab” and Muslim 
elite, who politically dominated the “Old 
Sudan,” repeatedly ignored demands from 
the politically, socially, and economically 
marginalised Sudanese from the south, 
west, and east of the country for equality 
and justice, stoking the first armed rebellion, 
which began in 1955 and lasted for 17 years 
(de Mabior 1987 and Khalid 1990). 
The period of relative peace, resulting from 
the conclusion of the Addis Ababa Peace 
Agreement between the Anyanya (Southern 
rebels) and the Sudanese government in 
1972, ended in 1983 when the Sudanese 
government reneged on the key terms of the 
peace deal. The country was subsequently 
engulfed in a second debilitating war. 
According to the leader of this rebellion, Dr. 
John Garang de Mabior, himself a veteran of 
the first rebellion, the underlying roots of the 
war, particularly exclusion of most Sudanese 
from socio-economic and political affairs, 
especially educational and other basic 
services, were no different from the causes 
of the first rebellion (de Mabior 1996). The 
impact of this war on Southern Sudan was 
catastrophic. Nearly 2.5 million died, at least 
4 million were displaced, and most of the 
educational facilities and other infrastructure 
that existed before the onset of the fighting 
were left in ruins.   
Following the end of the Second Sudanese 
Civil War in 2005, and the transformation 
of the SPLM from a rebel movement to 
the ruling party in Southern/South Sudan, 
politics and leadership performance did 
not dramatically change. In 2011, the 
new state of South Sudan was born. It 
had huge developmental potential, with 
land area of 644,330 square kilometres, 
population of 8.3 million (according to 
a disputed census conducted in 2008), 
and bountiful natural resources including 
oil and minerals, populous livestock, rich 
arable land, and Nile waters, as well as the 
goodwill of the international community 
which translated into billions of US dollars 
in aid (Maxwell et al 2018). Paradoxically, 
apart from oil resources, this potential went 
largely unexploited in large part because of 
perpetual conflicts in many of parts of South 
Sudan and poor governance. The country 
was dogged by heated political infighting, 
endemic corruption, tribalism, nepotism, 
proliferation of illegal arms, and war-related 
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trauma, all of which eroded public trust in 
leaders and governance institutions (UNDP 
2016).
The way SPLM leaders managed Southern/
South Sudan mirrored the manner leaders of 
the “Old Sudan” misgoverned their country 
with authoritarianism, endemic corruption, 
and other routine injustices. Indeed, it has 
been observed that South Sudan and Sudan 
followed a model of “two countries, one 
system,” after failure to develop along a 
“one country, two systems” paradigm (Deng 
2019). Unsurprisingly, South Sudan failed 
to transition into a peaceful nation after its 
independence. 
In December 2013, South Sudan again 
plunged into war, which has caused 
immense destruction of schools and other 
basic services, but this damage was not 
uniform across the country (Global Coalition 
to Protect Education from Attack 2018). 
Another significant consequence of the war 
was the dwindling of huge resources donors 
had previously poured into state building, 
including support to basic services, as their 
focus shifted to humanitarian assistance 
(Maxwell et al 2018). This further weakened 
the capacity of the government to provide 
basic education to its people, many of 
whom had been driven into refuge in other 
countries or Protection of Civilians Sites 
(PoCs) set up on United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan (UNMISS) bases. 
This article is based on information acquired 
from a variety sources. Firstly, relevant 
literature on provision of education going 
back to the Sudanese war from 1983 to 
2005 was consulted. Secondly, attention 
was paid to reports on education by UN 
agencies and other organisations that 
had been active in providing education in 
Southern/South Sudan. Thirdly, the study 
benefited from data generated in 2018 using 
Rapid Education Risk Analysis (RERA), a 
distinct and uniquely valuable methodology 
combining disaster, risk, resilience, and 
conflict analytic frameworks to generate 
evidence of how education and conflict 
interact. USAID has used this approach to 
provide snapshots of education provision 
in several other countries. In essence, 
the RERA is a mixed-methods approach, 
which captures the perceptions of learners, 
teachers, parents, and other community 
members about education provision. In 
South Sudan, it captured the perceptions 
of more than 900 informants across 27 
learning sites in Jonglei, Upper Nile, Unity, 
Western Equatoria, and Central Equatoria. 
Quantitative activities included math and 
reading assessments with Grade Three 
and Four learners, secondary data forms 
documenting enrolment and other key 
educational statistics for learning sites, and 
surveys with community-level informants on 
topics such as education access, facilities, 
and quality. Qualitative activities included 
interviews with religious and traditional 
leaders, youth and women’s group leaders, 
community members, children, teachers, 
and other stakeholders such as Ministry of 
General Education and Instruction officials, 
and international NGO as well as donor 
representatives. 
Section 2 discusses relevant literature for 
the article, especially on the role education 
can play in national cohesion, with a focus 
on Southern/South Sudan and Sudan. 
Section 3 traces the unequal education 
provision after 2005 and its implications for 
equality and hence national cohesion. The 
trajectory of inequality of service delivery 
became even more pronounced after the 
outbreak of war in December 2013, when 
many people fled to other countries and 
UNMISS bases, where communities are 
often ethnically segregated, and education 
and other services extended to mono-ethnic 
communities. Section 4 mainly deals with 
views of learners, teachers, parents, and 
other community members on quality of 
education and implications for national 
cohesion. Section 5 delves into funding for 
education by the government and external 
actors and its links not only to economic 
progress but also national cohesion. The 
last section concludes the article.
Education, peace, and rebellion
Education can cause individual, group, and 
societal progress. Oftentimes, however, it 
generates inequalities, with those enjoying 
higher educational achievement having 
more opportunities for advancement and 
those having less opportunities feeling 
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disadvantaged. In fact, it has been observed 
that education “is strongly connected to 
future economic activity and well-being and 
plays an important role in national identity 
and social cohesion” (The World Bank 2018: 
113). The inclusion of shared history and 
culture in the national curriculum across a 
country is one way of bringing about social 
cohesion. 
Whether educational opportunities 
favour or discriminate against some 
groups is, to a great extent, contingent 
on the choices made and actions taken 
by public authorities. No wonder South 
Sudanese, particularly leaders of armed 
struggles in Southern Sudan, persistently 
blamed the British colonial administration 
in Sudan (1899-1955) and regimes 
of post-independence Sudan for the 
poor educational outcomes and other 
deprivations in their part of the country. For 
example, Peter Adwok Nyaba explained 
that the British surrendered education 
in Southern Sudan to missionaries who 
“did not have any capacity apart from 
proselytization” (Nyaba 2019: 18). Moreover, 
he argued that education provision was 
deliberately tailored to “instil in southern 
Sudanese extreme hatred of the northern 
Sudan in general, and the Arabs and Islam 
in particular.” In addition, he claimed 
that education “[instilled] in southern 
Sudanese an inferiority complex and a 
fear of authority,” and rendered them 
“apolitical” as their substandard education 
“efficaciously diverted their attention from 
their backwardness to hatred of the northern 
Sudanese.”
The hatred culminated in the resumption of 
all-out war in 1955, causing the destruction 
of the meagre educational activities in 
Southern Sudan initiated by missionary 
groups. In 1964, the Sudanese government 
expelled Christian missionaries from the 
country and embarked on an aggressive 
drive to propagate Arabism and Islam in 
Southern Sudan as a way of uniting the 
country, which they had labelled as Arab and 
Muslim (Biel 2003). It used education as one 
of the vehicles to achieve this, which further 
alienated the non-Arab and largely non-
Muslim Southern Sudanese. An aspect of 
this government policy was a spirited push 
to Arabicize teaching in schools all over 
the country, which contributed to lowering 
of standards, particularly in the Southern 
region, where schools had operated in local 
languages and English during the British-led 
colonial regime (Tingway 2006: 84).
The notion of nation-building predicated on 
Arabism and Islam did not instil in Southern 
Sudanese the feeling of belonging in “the 
sense of the ‘we’ in relation to the ‘others’” 
in Sudan (Majeed et al 2008: 10). Instead, 
Southern Sudanese perceived the move 
as a threat to their identity, and as such 
should not only be rejected but opposed by 
all means. Consequently, the Anyanya or 
Southern-based rebels waged war against 
Sudanese regimes for a state of their own 
in the south of the country but agreed to a 
peace deal in 1972 that gave their region 
local autonomy and recognised their unique 
cultures. 
17 years of war caused schools in 
Southern Sudan to close, and learners 
and teachers to flee, some ending as 
refugees in neighbouring countries where 
educational opportunities were dismal. 
With the return of peace in 1972, conducive 
conditions prevailed for restarting robust 
educational activities at all levels. Schools 
were rehabilitated or built, and teachers 
were recruited and trained, and so gradually 
the educational environment improved 
for learners and teachers. The University 
of Juba was founded in 1977 to train 
personnel, including teachers, particularly 
for the autonomous Southern region as “a 
sign of redress of Southern grievances,” and 
also “to be instrument of social integration” 
as “different people from various parts of 
Sudan collected” (Tingwa 1993: 39 and 45). 
Albeit positive and significant, the progress 
in rebuilding the education system in 
Southern Sudan was painfully slow. As 
a result, many Southern Sudanese failed 
to access educational opportunities. For 
example, Southern Sudanese students 
found it very hard to compete for places at 
the universities in the country, including the 
University of Juba which was supposed to 
produce skilled manpower for their region 
(Tingwa 2006: 50).
The positive trend in the country, however, 
only lasted for 10 years as hostilities 
resumed in 1983 after the abrogation of 
key elements of the Addis Ababa Peace 
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Agreement by the then president, Jaafar 
Nimeiri, who was the very architect of the 
peace deal. Again, schools were targeted for 
destruction in Southern Sudan, and learners 
as well as teachers fled to relatively secure 
regions of the country or to other countries 
for refuge. The gains of the short period of 
peace brought about by the conclusion of 
the Addis Ababa Peace Agreement were 
quickly lost. 
Ironically, the leaders of the new rebel 
movement, SPLM/A, did not prioritise 
education in areas they controlled, but 
continued to lambast Khartoum-based 
regimes for marginalising Southern 
Sudanese in the provision of educational and 
other basic services. Peter Adwok Nyaba 
pointed out that “the first thing SPLM/A 
leadership did was to denigrate education 
and knowledge” (Nyaba 2019: 88). He stated 
that a one point, Garang told SPLA recruits 
in a training camp to tell former officials and 
students to throw their certificates away as 
they had no use for them (Nyaba 2019: 88). 
As Garang concentrated on building a 
formidable army to confront the Sudanese 
army, his compatriots in the SPLM/A 
recruited thousands of mostly Dinka and 
Nuer youth, often enticing them with the 
promise that they were being taken to 
Ethiopia for education. To an extent, the 
success of the SPLM/A in recruiting these 
young people was helped by the high 
value communities attached to education. 
Unfortunately, many of them perished after 
the Ethiopian leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam, 
was ousted from power in 1991 and the 
SPLA had to make a hurried exit from its 
bases on Ethiopian territory. Some of the 
survivors became the famous “Lost Boys” 
of Sudan, a group of about 10,000 boys who 
trekked to Kenya in 1992 seeking refuge 
(Biel 2003). They were settled in Kakuma 
and some found their way to the USA for 
resettlement.
The SPLM/A did pay some attention to 
education after its First National Convention, 
held in the Southern Sudan area of 
Chukudum in 1994, during which it sought to 
consult the local population in the territories 
it controlled on the way forward for the 
liberation struggle following its deadly split 
in 1991 that nearly led to the demise of 
the struggle. As a public authority in the 
territory it controlled, the SPLM/A strived to 
improve its relations with people to repair 
its image, which had been tarnished by the 
split in its ranks and continued government 
army onslaught. At the conference, a 
number of resolutions on education were 
adopted, including education as a key factor 
in the Movement’s struggle to liberate 
the individual and society from political, 
economic, social, and natural constraints 
(Biel 2003). However, the SPLM/A did not do 
much to implement the resolutions.
In 2002, as peace talks in Kenya between 
the Sudanese government and the SPLM/A 
progressed towards a comprehensive 
agreement, the Secretariat of Education 
of the New Sudan, the body of the SPLM 
mandated with tackling educational 
issues, adopted an educational policy, the 
mission of which, among other things, 
was to provide lifelong quality education 
to enable beneficiaries “to be responsible 
and productive citizens” (SPLM 2002). 
Among its goals and principles were to 
“foster nation building through integration, 
peace, self-reliance, patriotism and 
promoting respect and tolerance for 
the other cultures, traditions, opinions 
and belief.” Its implementation guides 
included: “inculcation of conflict resolution 
mechanisms, overcoming the culture of 
violence through avenues such as debates, 
drama, games and sports, visits, et cetera.” 
Quite clearly, the policy was informed by the 
then prevailing political climate in which the 
government was pressing on with Sharia 
and other measures to impose Islam and 
Arab culture on the country as well as the 
deadly South-on-South violence.  
A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was 
signed in Nairobi in 2005 ending the war, 
opening the door to rebuilding the education 
sector, and initiating other developments 
in the devastated Southern Sudan. With 
substantial oil revenues and goodwill of 
the international community, the future of 
education looked promising. The birth of 
the Republic of South Sudan in 2011 further 
raised the expectations of citizens for an 
end to poverty and speedy access to basic 
services, especially quality education that 
would help to heal the divisions caused by 
the war.
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Disparities in education provision 
and social cohesion
The decades of war left all facets of life 
in Southern Sudan, including educational 
opportunities, in shambles (The World Bank 
2012). The return of peace in 2005, and 
willingness of donors to finance recovery of 
the education sector, led to a rapid progress 
in the reconstruction and maintenance of 
old schools and the construction of new 
ones; recruitment and training of teachers; 
and the institution of regulatory systems, 
especially in rural and other locations that 
were badly left behind. It was apparent that 
the intention was to quickly provide suitable 
conditions to enhance access to quality 
education and exploit the full potential of 
education as a unifying factor after years of 
war had torn apart the social fabric binding 
Southern Sudanese together.  
The Government of South Sudan adopted 
the 2012 General Education Act (GEA), a 
significant milestone that provides for “the 
establishment of a regulatory framework 
and structures for general education system 
in South Sudan” (South Sudan General 
Education Act 2012: 3). The GEA and 
Transitional Constitution of the Republic of 
South Sudan (2011) stipulate that primary 
education is “free and compulsory,” which 
is clearly aimed at improving access to 
education. After its independence, South 
Sudan produced two general education 
plans: General Education Strategic Plan 
I (2012-2017) and General Education 
Strategic Plan II (2017-2022). These 
regulatory frameworks set the direction 
that all actors in the educational sphere 
are to follow to achieve the overall vision of 
education in the new country. 
In September 2015, the Ministry of General 
Education and Instruction launched 
a comprehensive national education 
curriculum for South Sudan to be 
implemented from 2018. This curriculum 
is competency-based and includes 
peacebuilding, which reflects the desire 
of the government to address the turmoil 
caused by persistent violence in the nascent 
country.  
Despite the efforts to improve teaching 
and learning in the country, much needs to 
be done because of the very poor state of 
the education sector when the war ended 
in 2005, and the resumption of fighting in 
the country shortly after its independence. 
Consequently, educational outcomes 
have continued to be poor. Based on the 
National Baseline Household Survey of 
2009, 72 percent of the adult population 
of South Sudan is illiterate, of which 44 
percent are females, and 43 percent are 
aged 15-29 (Ballon and Duclos 2016: 
134). It is estimated that 70 percent of 
South Sudanese are aged below 30 years. 
Moreover, the figures show that illiteracy 
rates are not uniform. Warrap is among the 
states with the highest rate (ibid). Indeed, it 
has been noted that education is unequally 
accessible in Sub-Sahara Africa, especially 
in conflict-ridden countries such as South 
Sudan (Shimeles and Verdier-Chouchane 
2016: 164).  
As noted earlier, unequal delivery of services, 
including educational services, is linked to 
conflict. This was clearly the case in pre-
independence South Sudan and remains 
the case. A study conducted by a team of 
researchers from various universities, led by 
University of Sussex, clearly confirmed the 
education-conflict nexus in South Sudan 
(Novelli et al 2016). After analysing available 
data, the team found that “states with the 
highest occurrence of conflict events since 
2011 (Unity, Upper Nile, Jonglei) have the 
lowest provision of educational resources 
and the lowest percentage of students in 
upper primary, reflecting the relationship 
between the occurrence of conflict and 
inequalities in educational resources and 
outcomes” (ibid: vi). Poor and unequal 
education does not lead to national 
cohesion.
The resumption of hostilities in December 
2013 had the most negative impact on 
education in the county. The conflict caused 
a huge upheaval with over 4 million people 
forced from their homes. A large number of 
learners were forced out of schools, many 
of which had been destroyed, abandoned, or 
occupied by armed people. UNESCO carried 
out a study in 2018 which revealed that of 
3.7 million school-aged population (6 to 17 
years), about 2.2 million were out of school 
– nearly 60 percent (UNESCO 2018). 
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The conflict, however, did not cause 
the same repercussions on education 
throughout the country. According to 
statistics produced by the Ministry of 
Education and Instruction, the number of 
students recorded in 2013 was 976,225, 
in 2015 was 1,192,381, and in 2016 was 
1,407,669 (Ministry of General Education 
and Instruction 2017). Reportedly, the 
greatest number of primary and secondary 
schools were recorded in the now defunct 
Yei River State, which was sucked into the 
violence. These schools were destroyed or 
abandoned as this area was largely emptied 
of its people, many of whom are still in 
Ugandan refugee camps. The large number 
of South Sudanese learners in Uganda are 
following the Ugandan system of education, 
which is tailored to the needs of Ugandan 
learners, and will have to adjust to the South 
Sudanese system on return home when 
peace is achieved.
According to a study carried out by the 
Education Cluster, a key cause of dropout 
from school is lack of food (Education 
Cluster 2016: 5). Greater Bahr el Ghazal has 
been affected by seasonal food shortages, 
though many parts of it are spared the 
violence between government forces and 
armed opposition groups. Another serious 
problem compounding the impact of conflict 
on education is seasonal floods, which are 
connected to climate change. The Education 
Cluster study reveals that before the 
outbreak of violence, 80 percent of schools 
in Upper Nile, the worst affected state, were 
only accessible by foot, almost double 
the percent of those accessible in the dry 
season (The Education Cluster 2016: 6-7). 
The ongoing catastrophic flooding in South 
Sudan has likely had even worse impacts on 
access to schools, especially in the Greater 
Upper Nile region. In fact, most of Jonglei 
state and Pibor administration area have 
been affected by the flooding. 
The flood situation will complicate the 
internal displacement challenge the country 
has experienced since the outbreak of war 
in 2013. In fact, many South Sudanese 
remain in PoCs on UNMISS bases, where 
NGOs have provided some educational 
opportunities. The communities in these 
sites are mainly mono-ethnic, and their 
continued existence in urban localities goes 
against the vision of building a cohesive 
nation. Moreover, the hugely anomalous 
phenomenon of PoCs, which are refugee-
like outfits in the capital and towns around 
the country, has attracted visibility and 
attention from the international community 
which has translated into assistance. This 
is often better than what is provided to 
other communities, especially those in 
neighbouring communities, which could 
generate grievances on the part of those 
who might feel unfairly treated by aid 
organisations. 
Some analyses confirm the different 
treatment of PoCs and other communities 
in South Sudan. For example, RERA, which 
includes maths and reading tests for grade 
2-4 students in PoC sites in Juba and 
neighbouring communities, found that PoC 
students had better performance. The math 
and reading tests results indicated that 
students in PoC sites scored higher than 
students in neighbouring sites, except for P3 
male students in neighbouring communities 
who scored 1.5 percent higher on average 
than their PoC site counterparts in maths. 
For details on numbers of students who 
took the tests in learning sites in the PoCs 
and surrounding communities, and average 
percent correct items, see the following table 
and figures below.
Number of math and reading assessments conducted by site type and grade
Site P2 P3 P4 Total
PoC 19 10 11 40
Surrounding community 19 17 24 60
Total 38 27 35 100
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Student Assessment Average Correct Items, surrounding communities and PoCs
Student Assessment Average Percent Correct Items, Surrounding Communities
Student Assessment Average Percent Correct Items, PoCs
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Alhough provision of educational services 
is relatively better, the overall situation of 
the PoCs is appalling, with many people 
forced to live in small spaces where privacy 
is almost non-existent and the threat 
of epidemics such as COVID-19 is ever 
present. Many PoC residents are still dealing 
with trauma resulting from the ethnic 
cleansing meted upon them at the hands 
of Dinka elements of South Sudan security 
apparatus in December 2013 (African Union 
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan 
2014). Unsurprisingly, some of these people 
have left the PoCs for other places within 
or outside the country, or are struggling to 
get out as pointed out by a female student 
interviewed in the Juba PoC for the RERA 
study:
“Some of our parents lost their jobs when 
the war erupted in Juba and so it became 
difficult to support our education and limited 
us to schools in the PoC which may not 
be offering quality education. Some of my 
friends whose parents are still working 
managed to get out from the camp, others 
went to Kenya or Uganda and are now 
studying in good schools.”
Another major challenge with schooling 
has to do with the kind of teachers in 
the schools, as well as their recruitment, 
development, and compensation. The next 
section focuses on this issue.
Teacher and student perceptions of 
teacher professional identity and 
education quality
South Sudan has been focusing more on 
access to education but less on quality of 
education accessible to learners. It recorded 
tremendous increases in enrolment 
figures since the Second Sudanese Civil 
War ended in January 2005 and before 
the resumption of fighting in December 
2013. The gross primary school enrolment 
increased from 21 percent to 72 percent 
from 2000 to 2009 (The World Bank 2012: 
39). However, the country failed to pay 
adequate attention to quality of education 
provision at all levels, which is not good for 
the future of the nascent state. Expressing 
the importance of educational quality, Dr. 
Lawrence Wuol Wuol perceptively informed 
a conference organised by University 
of Juba in Khartoum in 1993 that, “a 
university must strive for excellence that the 
generations coming tomorrow should be 
better than the generation of today” (Wuol 
1993: 279). The comment quite clearly 
applies to other schools, for achievement 
of quality at university also has to do with 
the quality of students being produced at 
lower educational levels. When the quality 
of primary and secondary schools is poor, 
the students arriving at the university will 
be of poor quality as well. This will lead to 
poor graduates at the university, which is 
supposed to not only produce a capable 
workforce and quality research, but also 
cultivate a culture that brings cohesion, 
especially in a conflict-affected one like 
South Sudan.
The low quality of education in the country 
is particularly evident in the rural payams, 
villages, and bomas, which are the most 
neglected places by the leaders of the 
country even though formally they are 
supposed to have some powers to execute 
activities for the benefit of local people. The 
management of education in the country 
is highly decentralised, but the truth is that 
offices at lower-level administrations have 
limited resources. Moreover, they also have 
limited say on the way education is provided, 
as elucidated by the team of researchers led 
by University of Sussex (mentioned earlier): 
“However, participant descriptions of sector 
management reflected a deconcentrated 
form of decentralization based on 
centralized policy decisions with limited 
political authority at the sub-national level 
and little space for representation of local 
education officials. Participants at the 
school and payam level felt that their voices 
and concerns are not clearly heard, and 
that they are often undermined by higher 
government levels and donors (for example, 
by bypassing payams when approaching 
schools). While school governing 
bodies play a key role in school-level 
management, teachers and youth suffer 
lack of representation in decision-making 
processes, which can increase their risk for 
involvement in violence when combined with 
inequalities in access to professional and 
economic opportunities” (Novelli 2010: iii).
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Persistent demands by communities for 
deployment of teachers to payams, villages, 
and bomas, and their timely and adequate 
payment, have often fallen on deaf ears from 
those with the power and remit to rectify the 
situation. As a result, many schools ended 
up recruiting untrained volunteers to fill the 
gaps. 
The RERA study paid special attention to 
the situation of South Sudanese teachers, 
who have been hard hit by the conflict. 
Challenges confronting teachers range from 
unfair recruitment practices to irregular 
and low salaries. A large proportion of 
key informants involved in the study 
complained that teacher recruitment was 
not merit-based and dogged with ethnic 
favouritism and nepotism. A majority of 
teacher focus group discussions pointed out 
that appointment of teachers, particularly 
in government schools, were based on 
relationships (government officials appoint 
those they are related to or know well). This 
is perhaps not surprising considering the 
existence of rampant corruption, nepotism, 
and other injustices in the country. 
The upsurge of violence and utter neglect 
of the education sector meant that trained 
and competent teachers drifted away 
from the sector to pursuits that promise 
better opportunities for higher incomes. A 
key informant from an international NGO 
explained that the country:
“has been in crisis situation for a long time. 
Before the conflict, there are people with the 
necessary skills but what are you now left 
with? Some teachers have not completed 
secondary school…In the learning spaces, 
teachers have varying capacities. Many 
of them are volunteers. Some have not 
been trained as teachers. The minimum 
requirement would be that the community 
accepts the teachers to teach their children; 
the goodwill of the community is important. 
In some of the PoCs, some teachers took 
manual jobs because of pay.”     
The payment of irregular and exceptionally 
low salaries is a persistent cause of 
complaints on the part of teachers. Over 
three quarters of focus groups involving 
teachers and sub-national level key 
informants voiced concerns about teachers’ 
salaries not being paid fully or being paid 
late. Because of this, some teachers cannot 
concentrate on their teaching profession and 
many of them are forced to combine it with 
other roles to sustain their families. Quite 
clearly, they are not focussed and motivated 
to serve their students and communities.
It has also been noted that deployment of 
teachers was complicated by the enmities 
wrought by the significant ethnic overtones 
of the. Some people were killed or forced 
to leave their place of abode on account 
of their ethnic belonging, and some of 
the survivors might still harbour anger 
and frustration against other groups that 
targeted them due to their ethnicity. A telling 
example are the PoCs, which are mainly 
inhabited by people from a single or a few 
ethnic groups. For example, Nuer are the 
majority inhabitants of the PoCs in Juba. 
The teachers in the area are Nuer, and quite 
clearly no one would deploy Dinka teachers 
there for fear of being targeted by some 
Nuer who are still angry because of the 
killings that forced them to flee to the PoCs, 
which they attribute to Dinka elements of the 
security forces. Therefore, one significant 
challenge to communities without sufficient 
qualified teachers is that they will fail 
to recruit because deploying teachers 
from other ethnic groups will be risky. So, 
acceptance of teachers by communities 
is a major issue that continues to concern 
teachers themselves and pose problems for 
social cohesion.
Moreover, the lack of trained teachers 
in schools has been linked to whether 
students continue to attend or drop out 
of classes. When students go to a school 
where teaching is badly affected by poor 
attendance of teachers, it is likely that 
they will skip classes and possibly drop 
out altogether. In the RERA study, over 90 
percent of student focus groups, both male 
and female, mentioned that students drop 
out or miss classes due to a range of factors 
including low teacher salaries that cause 
teachers to strike, and school closures. 
Furthermore, the learning environment 
– characterised in some instances by 
temporary structures, and lack of textbooks 
and other scholastic materials – has fuelled 
frustration among students, teachers, and 
parents. All national level key informants 
who participated in the RERA study 
noted that lack of teaching materials has 
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negatively impacted the quality of teaching 
and motivation of teachers. This problem 
is certainly more acute in rural areas, some 
of which are still mired in violence linked to 
actions of armed groups or youth involved 
in cattle rustling and associated revenge 
attacks. For example, Jonglei state and 
Pibor administrative area are suffering 
disruptions, which also affect schools and 
provision of other basic services, due to 
massive violence involving youth from Dinka, 
Nuer, and Murle communities. Many people 
were forced to leave their homes in parts 
of Pibor as heavily armed Dinka and Nuer 
youth pillaged villages, allegedly in revenge 
for violence caused by Murle youth in their 
areas. Ending this problem will include 
rebuilding or establishing schools with good 
teachers in the locations where the youth 
are originating and encouraging them to 
learn new skills and change their attitudes to 
forever end the cycles of attack and revenge. 
The next section addresses the financing of 
education and implications for ownership 
and cohesion.
External support for basic education
Donors, international organisations, and 
national organisations have played a pivotal 
role in the education sector in South Sudan, 
especially considering that the government 
has been investing meagre resources in the 
sector. The yearly budgetary allocation to 
the education sector in the country is very 
small, only between five and eight percent 
of the overall annual resource envelope (The 
World Bank 2012: 6). The bulk of the sector’s 
financing has come from international 
actors. In fact, this raises questions 
about the political will of South Sudanese 
leaders to support the sector as well as its 
ownership. Expectedly, the international 
actors have their own ideas about the 
sector and how it should be organised for 
maximum benefit. For example, funding 
is largely directed at basic and secondary 
education, but the leaders of the country 
would probably want higher education, 
especially universities, to be prioritised as 
well. 
Donors’ interest in aiding delivery of 
educational was premised on the notion that 
delivery of services to the long-underserved 
South Sudanese populace would lead to 
enhancement of the legitimacy of their 
leaders (Moro et al 2017). Their support 
included huge initiatives entailing millions 
of US dollars to increase education access 
in the country as well as access to other 
services. In February 2015, for example, 
President Salva Kiir launched the Back to 
Learning (BTL) initiative as a way of solving 
the problem of the 2.2 million out-of-school 
children. The initiative brought together 
educational partners and donors for a 
concerted action aimed at bringing the out-
of-school children back to the classroom. 
The programme was led by UNICEF and 
supported by Norway, USAID, DFID, EU, and 
Denmark. The first phase was from 2015-
2017 and the second from 2017-2020. BTL 
was a comprehensive educational program 
featuring a number of activities and thematic 
areas. Its overarching objective was the 
equitable access to quality education and 
peacebuilding interventions that contribute 
to lasting peace, intercommunity harmony, 
and sustainable development. Therefore, it 
was directly tailored to reduce conflicts and 
promote national cohesion.
Moreover, donors have played an 
instrumental part in special programmes, 
including enhancing girls’ education 
through grants, curriculum development, 
and teachers’ incentives. The Girls’ 
Education South Sudan, mostly funded by 
DFID, provided grants for girls to access 
and remain in schools. Also, donors and 
international organisations supported the 
development of a comprehensive curriculum 
for the nation, which is more suited to the 
conditions of the country as it incorporates 
important issues such as peacebuilding to 
promote national cohesion. Moreover, they 
have supported teachers to continue to 
serve in schools by providing incentives.
Quite clearly, the support of donors has been 
crucial in the development of the education 
sector which is a key to forging national 
cohesion in the nascent country.   
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Conclusion
Accessible quality education is essential 
for the development of country, as well 
as a factor in forging a collective sense of 
belonging, especially in fragile countries 
torn apart by war and associated ethnic 
animosities. This article argues that 
education in South Sudan has yet to 
significantly serve as a force to mould the 
country into a cohesive nation. Instead, 
the way education is being delivered 
accentuates inequalities in the country, 
continuing from a trajectory of uneven 
development that characterised educational 
provision before the secession of Southern 
Sudan from Sudan.  
The article was based on information 
acquired from several sources, including 
published materials and findings from a 
RERA study carried out in 2017. The article 
focuses on the legacies of uneven delivery 
of educational services in pre-independence 
South Sudan and its political repercussions, 
the rapid expansion of educational provision 
after the end of the Second Sudanese Civil 
War, and the eruption of violence in 2013 
and its impact on education provision. It 
highlights the often-neglected perceptions 
of teachers, students, parents, local 
administrators, and other government 
officials. In the context of ongoing conflict 
and curtailment of freedom of expression by 
South Sudan’s elites, views, opinions, and 
perceptions of most South Sudanese about 
their country are not being safely and readily 
voiced (Thiong 2018). 
The conflict led to a loss of some of the 
gains South Sudan made in the area of 
education. Many students have been 
forced to drop out as schools are destroyed 
or occupied by armed elements, low 
investment, lack of teaching and learning 
materials, displacement of families, and 
abandonment of teaching by some teachers 
due mainly to irregular and low salaries. 
However, the impacts of the war are not 
uniform. The weaknesses in the education 
sector are more acute in some areas, such 
as the hitherto relatively more prosperous 
Equatoria region, large parts of which 
have been wreaked by violence involving 
government and rebel forces. The unequal 
delivery of educational services undermines 
social cohesion. 
Moreover, the conflict has resulted in 
concentration of displaced persons in 
certain locations with relatively better 
provision of educational services which 
does not promote national healing and 
cohesion. This phenomenon is noted in 
some refugee settings where new arrivals 
often receive better services compared to 
services benefitting the host populations, 
fuelling grievance and disagreements. A 
similar situation has been noted in the 
PoCs. These “warehouses” attract a lot of 
attention from humanitarian actors. The 
RERA study found that education provision 
to PoCs populations, despite their miserable 
overall situation, is better, and therefore 
students in them perform better than those 
in neighbouring communities. This does not 
help in healing the disrupted social fabric of 
the country.
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